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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we look to model de volatility of money market 
interest rates -and the transmission of volatility- along the money market 
yield curve in four countries: the UK, Germany, France and Spain. We 
use a conditional variance specification which is based on Nelsonts 
Exponential ARCH. We find a significant volatility transmission effect from 
overnight to longer term money markets for France, Spain an the UK. We 
also find that, in our small cross section of countries, those with lower 
(higher) reserve requirements tend to have higher (lower) interbank 
interest rate volatility. However, reserve requirements generate a 
perverse seasonal effect: at the end of the maintenance period, both the 
level of the overnight interest rate volatility and the magnitude of the 
transmission effect to the rest of the yield curve are higher. 
- 3 -

I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate over optimal monetary policy has often focused on the 
analysis of volatility tradeoffs associated with different monetary policy 
schemes. In the early eighties, a number of central banks 
experimented with monetary control procedures based upon targeting 
of the high-powered money base. But increasing liberalization and the 
progressive opening-up of financial markets made standard transmission 
mechanisms unstable, and generated a high level of volatility in short­
term money market interest rates. This was one of the major factors 
provoking a shift back in monetary control procedures towards 
controlling short-term interest rates during the eighties'. 
The desire to achieve a high degree of stability in short-term interest 
rates is also apparent in the discussion, currently underway among 
national central banks, regarding the operations and procedures to be 
followed by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) come Stage 
Three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). But despite some 
evidence of convergence, significant national differences remain in the 
institutional mechanics of monetary policy operation across the 
Community2. 
One of the areas of less consensus is that regarding the appropriate 
use of reserve requirements as an instrument of monetary controe. One 
important rationale which has risen to prominence when justifying 
reserve requirements is their potential stabilising effect on money 
'See, e.g. Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989) and Goodhart 
(1989) . 
'For recent surveys of monetary policy operations among 
industrialised countries see, inter alia, Kasman (1992), Bernanke and 
Mishkin (1992), Schnadt (1993), Economic Unit (1992). 
J Although reserve requirements have in general been lowered In 
the recent past - both across the Community and elsewhere - significant 
national differences remain: as a proportion of eligible liabilities, 
required reserves varied between a high of over 12% in Germany on 
sigth deposits, and a low of 0% in the United Kingdom, in 1992. 
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market interest rates. Arguments defending this stabilising effect are 
based on the notion of reserve requirements as a "buffer-stock" of 
liquidity. In simple terms, the argument runs as follows: Required 
reserves need only be met on average over the maintenance period. 
They can therefore be drawn down to meet any adverse liquidity shock 
during this period, to be augmented subsequently. This buffer of 
liquidity, it is argued , thereby insulates the interbank market from 
such liquidity shocks. Accordingly, money market interest rates - in 
particular at short maturity - are stabilised. 
Both the monetary policy shift towards the use of short-term interest 
rates during the eighties , and the current debate over the stabilizing 
effects of reserve requirements, illustrate the importance attributed by 
most central banks to maintaining stable prices in the very short-term 
money markets. Hence , implicitly, it is assumed that volatility is not 
Internalised in the short-term money markets, but is instead 
transmitted, to a significant extent, to the longer term rates relevant 
to investment and consumption decisions. To our knowledge, however, 
there is little empirical evidence documenting such strong volatility 
transmission along the yield curve . 
In this paper we consider the empirical basis for the above view. 
Specifically, we look to model the volatility of money market interest 
rates - and the transmission of volatility - along the money market yield 
curve in four European countries: the UK (8 "low" required reserves 
country) ;  Germany (a "high" required reserves country); and France 
and Spain (which hold Intermediate positions. ) 
The paper is planned as follows. Section II outlines the methodology 
used; Section III discusses the measurement of shortest maturity 
overnight interest rate volatilities. Section IV explores the possibility 
of volatility transmission along the money market yield curve . And 
section V briefly concludes. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The hypotheses put forward in the introduction are clearly concerned 
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primarily with the volatility of money market interest rate movements. 
Methodologically, a number of approaches have been suggested to model 
the second-order moments of economic time-series. 
The simplest, and least satisfactory, is to take unconditional moments . 
This is broadly the approach followed in Kasman (1992) when 
considering some of the issues posed above . Its principal drawback is 
an economic one: it is uncertainty - the unpredictable part of a 
variable's movement - rather than variability per se which matters most 
to economic agents. In particular, when conducting analysis of 
interbank interest rate behaviour, we would wish to partial out from 
variance those movements directly attributable to observable official 
interest rate changes. Such official rate changes are clearly within the 
information set of agents. Thus, when comparing volatilities over time 
or across country, we need to control for the differential sizes, speeds 
and frequencies at which official rates are adjusted. 
The above considerations lead us to consider conditional measures of 
variance. In that regard, various methodologies suggest themselves 
(see, for example, Pagan and Ullah (1988». But undoubtedly the most 
popular in financial economics has been the ARCH approach and 
subsequent derivatives of it, owing originally to Engle (1983).' Here 
we use a conditional variance specification which is based on Nelson's 
(1991) Exponential ARCH. This specification allows us to deal with 
asymmetric responses of conditional variances to negative and positive 
shocks, and to include exogenous variables in a rather unrestricted 
way. Thus, given a variable Xt , we model its conditional variance at 
period t-l ( ht ) as 
( 1) 
• See Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) for a survey of the 
burgeoning ARCH literature. 
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where E, (= x, - Et-l X,) • is the unexpected component of x, and Z, 
is a vector of explanatory variables. If (,)1 is greater (lower) than 
zero t then the response of the conditional variance to a positive shock 
at period t-i is larger (lower) than the response to a negative shock'. 
The log-linear form means that we do not have to restrict the 
coefficients in the conditional variance specification to be non-negative 
such as to ensure a non-negative variance. This is important because 
we want to estimate freely whether it is volatility transmission or 
volatility transfer which occurs along the money market yield curve. 
As we will see below, the term Zt typically includes "seasonapt 
dummies for the overnight interest rate, together with terms that 
capture volatility transmission effects for longer maturity interest 
rates. The conditional mean specification accommodates both the steady­
state and the dynamic properties of interbank interest rates, with 
respect to movements in official interest rates. 
The conditional variance process together with a conditional mean 
specification for each maturity interest rate were then jointly estimated 
using maximum likelihood' . 
III. THE CONDITIONAL VARIANCE OF OVERNIGHT INTEREST RATES 
The countries whose money market interest rates we consider are: the 
UK, Germany, France and Spain. Our sample covers the period 
January' 1988 to January 1993.' The data are daily, thus giving us 
well over 1000 observations; they come from the Banco de Espana or 
from the BIS datatape. Our basic approach to specifying the mean-
'The only difference with the specification in Nelson (1991) is that 
we do not normalize the shocks by their conditional variance. 
'A Gauss code with the estimation routine using analytical 
derivatives are available from the authors on request. 
'In the French case, the sample begins in January 1990 . 
- 8 -
variance models is worth briefly touching upon. 
Unit root tests, based upon the testing procedure outlined in Perron 
(1988), indicated that all of the interest rate series - for each country, 
and at each point along the yield curve - were 1 (1) processes over our 
sample. Our general approach was, therefore, to specify our mean 
model in difference terms, but with an equilibrium solution (error­
correction mechanism) imposed upon it: 
• " 
where r and 0 stand, respectively, for interbank and official interest 
rates. This mean model can be interpreted as the reduced-form of 
interactions between official and interbank interest rates. 
The levels solution in the mean models is specified such that, in 
equilibrium, official and money marke� interest rates have a unit 
relationship. The null of unit cointegration between official and money 
market interest rates was not rejected in 14 out of 16 cases; though, 
predictably, it was weaker the longer the interbank interest rate 
maturity. Since interest rates are 1(1), this cointegration restriction 
upon money market interest rates is equivalent to imposing mean­
reversion upon the term premium. 
The models for the (log) conditional variance were specified as in 
equation (1). Where appropriate, the autoregressive terms were 
augmented with asymmetry effects, and with "seasonal" dummies to 
capture the effects of the reserve requirement maintenance period upon 
the volatility of interbank interest rates. The dummies accommodate the 
stylised fact that the variance of interbank interest rates may be 
heightened towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. Similar 
such effects have been found to be important in the US, both for the 
level of interbank interest rates (see Barrett et al. , 1988; Saunders and 
Urich, 1988) and for their variability (see Spindt and Hoffmeister, 
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1988; Lasser, 1988) . · Seasonal effects are therefore included here. The 
specification and interpretation of these mean-variance models for each 
country can be seen most clearly by considering each in turn. 
(a) United Kingdom 
The UK is the most straightforward of the cases to consider since : (i) 
it has a clearly defined measure of official interest rates to enter into 
the conditioning set - banks' base rate;9 (ii) there is a zero reserve 
requirement and no reserve maintenance period - hence no reason to 
expect "seasonal" volatility effects. Our preferred mean-variance 
specification for UK overnight interest rates is shown in Table 1 .  
The mean-variance model appears reasonably well-specified: the 
diagnostics for residual autocorrelation (LM) and ARCH effects (LM2) 
up to fifth order, are both easily satisfied. Moreover, most parameter 
values accord with intuition. In the mean model, the impact effect of a 
1 percentage point official interest rate change upon overnight rates is 
0.58 percentage points. Thereafter, any remaining differential between 
official and overnight rates is eradicated at the rate 0.23% per period 
(the error-correction coefficient). Both parameters are highly 
significant, and are consistent with reasonably rapid convergence of 
overnight on official rates - as we would expect from such shortest­
maturity interest rates. 90% of the adjustment of overnight rates is 
completed after 11 days. 
The (log) conditional variance model indicates highly significant ARCH 
effects up to fifth order - justifying our ARCH specification. There 
are, however, few indications of asymmetries within these effects. 
(b) Germany 
'We do not, however, find significant seasonal effects on the 
conditional mean of interbank interest rates for our sample of countries. 
'Strictly, the official interest rate of the Bank of England is the 
dealing rate on shortest maturity (bands 1 and 2) eligible b!ll 
purchases. But there is a fixed differential between this rate and base 
rate over our sample. 
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The German case contrasts markedly with the UK one: there is no 
single, unambiguous measure of official interest rate changes; and the 
existence of positive reserve requirements means that we might expect 
maintenance period effects upon conditional variance. This adds to the 
complexity of the mean-variance specification. 
The first problem is the more difficult. The Bundesbank has more 
than one official rate at its disposal. And these measures are clearly 
non -orthogonal. Changes in policy may thus be signalled by either the 
Lombard (ceiling) rate, the Discount (floor) rate, or by the repo rate 
at the Bundesbank's weekly auction in securities. The first two 
variables are more often used for signalling low frequency shifts in 
policy, whether when rates are being raised (Lombard), or when they 
are falling (Discount). The repo rate, by contrast, is more a high­
frequency fine-tuning device for, in particular, short-maturity 
interbank interest rates. But all three may - to greater or lesser extent 
- potentially influence interbank interest rates along the money market 
yield curve because of their signalling role. 
Our general approach to this problem has been to accommodate all 
three measures of official rates, freely estimating their dynamic and 
steady-state relations with money-market interest rates. 10 Thus the 
error-correction terms in our German mean models are the residuals 
from a freely-estimated first-stage levels regression of the interbank 
interest rate on the three official rates. II It is difficult to give the 
individual coefficients in this long-run relation a structural 
interpretation. If there exists more than one cointegrating vector 
among the variables, these coefficients are a weighted linear 
combination of each of the structural coefficients. But while 
interpreting individual coefficients is hazardous, interpreting them 
collectively is not: taken together, the coefficients define the steady­
state relation between interbank interest rates and weighted official 
rates, where the weights are freely (and superconsistently) estimated. 
lOUsing one or other of these rates by itself yielded less satisfactory 
results; the restrictions imposed seemed not to be satisfied. 
liAs with the other error-correction terms, these rc�: iuals were 
checked for, and found to be, stationary. 
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SImilar logic applies to the dynamic terms In the three official interest 
rates used in the mean model, which collectively are interpretable as 
measuring the impact effect of "policy" . 
On the second problem, the existence of reserve requirements means 
that we might expect some maintenance period seasonality in the 
variance of interbank rates. In Germany, the maintenance period runs 
over one month, ending on the last working day of the month. We 
accommodate the possibility of seasonality by including two dummy 
variables: the first accounting for "last day" (of the maintenance 
period) effects; the other for "last week" effects. Given these 
considerations, our preferred mean-variance specification for German 
overnight rates is shown in Table 1. 
A number of points are of note. First, the freely estimated coefficients 
within the error-correction mechanism sum, almost identically, to unity 
(0.99). This is a desirable property of the system. It means that the 
German model can be considered the freely-estimated analogue of the 
other country models (which impose a unit elasticity), only with three 
measures of official interest rates: there exists steady-state 
proportionality between overnight and (weighted) official interest 
rates. The coefficients on the error-correction term (-0.1) and the 
(sum of the) Lombard and repo rates" (0. 27) are both less than half 
the size of those in the UK case. This suggests a more sluggish 
convergence of German overnight rates on official rates. 
The conditional variance specification, as with the UK, includes ARCH 
effects up to fifth order, but now with significant asymmetry effects 
also. The role of the dummy variables within the variance model is 
particularly striking. They indicate that the conditional variance of 
German overnight rates is almost two and a half times times greater than 
its average during the last week of the maintenance period; and more 
than three and a half times more volatile on the last day of the 
maintenance period (taking the coefficients on dd and dw together). 
This finding accords with evidence from the US for the Fed funds rate 
"The Discount rate and the constant term were found to be 
insignificant and were dropped. 
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(Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988» . Finally, the German mean-variance 
model appears reasonably well-specified, with autocorrelation and ARCH 
tests of the residuals easily satisfied at 5%. 
(e) France 
The French case has many parallels with the German one. The 
maintenance period for reserve requirements is again one month; so we 
include the "last week" and "last day" dummies, as for Germany. But 
our measure of official rates is simpler than for Germany comprising a 
single instrument: Mise en Pension (a repo rate). While, in principle, 
the French system appears similar to the German one with a band of 
official interest rates, in practice this repo rate was found to serve a 
dominant signalling function. The error-correction term, then, imposes 
a unit relationship between overnight rates and this measure of official 
interest rates. The preferred specification is given in Table 1. 
The error-correction coefficient (-0. 19) and, in particular, the impact 
effect of an official rate change (0.79) are both significantly larger than 
in the German case. Convergence of overnight on official rates, 
following a policy shock, thus occurs rapidly: more than 90% of the 
adjustment is completed after four days. Within the variance 
specification, ARCH effects are again significant up to fifth order, and 
with asymmetries. But the seasonal dummies indicate a much weaker 
effect upon volatility from the maintenance period than was true for 
Germany. Conditional variance is only 30% higher than on average on 
the last day of the maintenance period; and is, if anything, lower than 
average over the course of the last week. At least part of the 
explanation for this can be found in the fact that there are carryover 
provisions for excess reserves under the French system of reserve 
requirements. These, in turn, serve to diffuse incipient pressures 
upon liquidity towards the end of the maintenance period. Finally on 
specification, while there exists some evidence of first-order 
autocorrelation - the LM test fails at 5% - there are no signs of 
remaining ARCH effects within the residuals. 
(d) Spain 
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The Spanish case is similar to the French one, but for the fact that the 
maintenance period for reserve requirements runs over a ten-day, 
rather than one month, period. Accordingly, the seasonal dummies we 
include cover the last three days of the maintenance period, together 
with the last day. The Spanish measure of official interest rates is 
Prestamos de Regulaci6n Monetaria up until 14 May 1990, and thereafter 
is Subasta de Certificados del Banco de Espaiia; both are intervention 
(repo) rates. The preferred specification is shown in Table 1 .  
Both diagnostics on the specification are satisfied at 5%. While the 
impact effect of an official interest rate change is similar to that for the 
UK, the additional role of the lagged term, together with the error­
correction coefficient, means that convergence of overnight on official 
rates is faster than in any of the other three cases: 90% of the 
adjustment is complete after only two days. The variance model again 
comprises significant ARCH effects with asymmetries and, most 
interestingly, accords a large and significant role to the seasonal 
dummy variables. These dummies indicate that overnight interest rate 
volatility may be as much as four times higher than its mean on the last 
day of the maintenance period. This result parallels that found for 
Germany. 
(e) Comparing Overnight Conditional Variances 
Having set down the mean-variance specifications for overnight rates 
in each country, it remains only to compare our parametric measures of 
conditional variance across them. Chart 1 summarises the mean values 
of the overnight interest rate conditional variance for each country. 
It also gives the required reserve ratio (on sight deposits) as it stood 
during 1992. " 
In general, the pattern of overnight volatilities accords with the 
stabilisation hypothesis. Conditional variability is highest for the zero 
"In France and Germany, required reserve ratios are levied at 
different rates on different classes of eligible liabilities. Here we have 
taken sight deposits as our benchmark liability, since these typically 
comprise a high proportion of banks' total liabilities. 
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reserve requirement country, the UK; and lowest for the high reserve 
requirement country, Germany. France and Spain hold intermediate 
positions: the rankings of their overnight interest rates volatilities is 
also in line with the levels of required reserves they impose. Naturally, 
this casual evidence is far from being a formal test of the stabilisation 
hypothesis. But, despite the countervailing influence of heightened 
"seasonalityt' in interbank interest rate volatility J it is consistent with 
it. On the other hand, this evidence still leaves unresolved the larger 
question of whether this (in)stability at the short end of the money 
market yield curve is also evident at the long end: whether excess 
overnight interest rate volatility translates into longer-term 
expectations of monetary policy. This is important because not all 
central banks look to regulate overnight rates as their means of 
signalling monetary policy changes -for example, in the UK. 
IV. VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION 
In this section we consider for each country the mean-variance 
behaviour of money market rates at one-month, three-month and one 
year maturities - thereby spanning the whole of the money market yield 
curve. In addition, given the previous discussion, we consider 
potential spillovers of volatility from overnight onto longer maturity 
interest rates; that is, voletility transmission along the money market 
yield curve. Our general approach to this problem was to substitute 
into our conditional variance specifications for each maturity interest 
rate, the measures of overnight interest rate conditional variance 
generated in section III. The coefficient on this term then measures the 
proportion of overnight volatility transmitted to longer maturity 
rates." Since this proportion need not be independent of the level of 
gross volatility, we also consider what additional role is played by the 
maintenance period in the transmission of volatility. For this, we 
included multiplicative dummies with the overnight conditional variance 
term, to capture potential additional "last day" and nlast week" 
"We assume, conveniently but realistically, that overnight interest 
rate volatility is not Granger caused by longer maturity interest rate 
innovations. 
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volatility transmission. Otherwise, our approach when specifying the 
mean-variance models was the same as that used in the previous 
section. The models for each maturity interest rate and for each 
country are summarised in Tables 2 through 4. The basic properties of 
these models are worth briefly summarising. 
(a) General Properties of the Mean-Variance Models Along the Yield 
Curve 
The cross-country mean models for different maturity interest rates 
appear reasonable. Broadly-speaking, the Impact effects of policy are 
smaller, and the rate of convergence on official rates (via the error­
correction term) is slower, the longer the interest rate maturity. 15 
From an expectations theory perspective, this is a sensible property. 
On the variance specifications, ARCH effects were again pervasive for 
each country. Diagnostics on the mean-variance models were in most 
cases easily satisfied at 5%. Some special cases are, however, worth 
noting. 
First, in the German case the dynamic effect of repo rates upon longer 
maturity interbank rates was Insignificant and thus was omitted. This 
is consistent with repo rates serving primarily as a fine-tuning device 
for shortest-maturity interbank rates; they are, correspondingly, less 
important for longer maturity rates. 16 
Second, for the UK the impact effect of policy is felt as strongly by 
one and three-month rates as by overnight rates. This is consistent 
with one to three-month rates being the pivotal point on the UK money 
market yield curve - the touchstone for agents' expectations of future 
"In the French case, the error-correction term was wrongly signed 
at a one-year maturity and was omitted. The error-correction 
coefficient for German one-year rates, though negative, is 
insignificantly different from zero. 
''The coefficients in the error-correction term for Germany again 
sum, proximately, to unity: 0.98 for one month rates; 0.96 for three 
month rates; and 0.86 for one year rates. 
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officlal rates - rather than overnight rates as for other countries. 
(b) Comparing Conditional Variances Along the Yield Curve 
Chart 1 summarises our parametric measures of conditional variance for 
each country along the money market yield curve. This raises a number 
of points. First, all four countries exhibit a U-shaped volatility pattern 
moving along the yield curve: volatilities are highest at the shortest 
(overnight) and longest (one year) ends of the curve. Second, 
volatility clearly falls away more rapidly as we move along the yield 
curve in the UK than in, for example, Germany. This is consistent with 
the UK authorities seeking to stabilise money market expectations at a 
point on the yield curve of longer maturity than one day. Third, 
despite this, all conditional volatilities along the UK and French money 
market yield curves lie above those in Germany and Spain. 
Expectations of monetary policy - as measured along the whole of the 
money market yield curve - thereby appear noisier in the UK and 
France. 
(e) Volatility Transmission Along the Yield Curve 
There are marked differences in the patterns of volatility transmission 
cross-country, as measured by the overnight conditional variance 
parameter and its multiplicative dummies. See Table 5 for a summary of 
these parameters. The largest differences are those between, on the 
one hand, Germany and, on the other, the UK, France and Spain. 
The UK, French and Spanish cases are the easier to interpret. All 
three suggest some spillover of volatility from the overnight money 
market into longer maturity rates. For France and Spain, the extent of 
this spillover, or volatility transmission, lies between 10-20% . This 
transmission is generally lower, the longer the interest rate maturity -
again, as we might expect. At all maturities, volatility transmission is 
significant in France and Spain. In the Spanish case, volatility 
transmission is proportionally larger on the last day of the maintenance 
period, when overnight interest rate volatility is up to four times its 
mean value. Transmission, therefore, appears proportionally greater 
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when the level of volatility is high. 
These results are consistent with a fairly sizable and robust spillover 
of uncertainty from the overnight market into longer-term expectations 
of monetary policy in France and Spain. This transmission goes some 
way towards explaining why the French and Spanish monetary 
authorities may seek actively to stabilise overnight interest rates: 
longer-term monetary policy expectations may be disrupted otherwise. 
In the UK, the coefficients measuring volatility transmission - while 
positive - are in all cases less large than in France and Spain; and for 
the one month and one year rates, they are in addition statistically 
insignificant. This lower transmission of volatility is consistent with the 
UK authorities aiming to stabilise interest rates at a maturity longer 
than one day, without paying too much attention to reducing overnight 
interest rate volatility. 
But there is an important qualification here. The one point on the UK 
yield curve where volatility transmission is statistically significant (8% 
transmission) is at a three-month maturity. This is precisely the point 
on the UK money market yield curve at which the monetary policy 
expectations of agents are often thought to focus. And, from our 
estimates, it appears that uncertainty regarding these expectations is 
not completely insulated from high-frequency noise in the overnight 
market. Moreover, while volatility transmission is proportionally quite 
small in the UK, absolute volatility spillovers into longer-term monetary 
policy expectations are larger than in France or Spain. 
The German case is the most perplexing. The signs on the overnight 
conditional variance terms here are rarely significantly different from 
zero. Moreover, the one maturity at which volatility effects are 
significant - one year - they are negatively signed. This suggests 
transfer, rather than transmission, of volatility along the German 
money market yield curve17• 
l7The (in) significance of the volatility terms is robust to alterations 
in the variance specification. For example, the inclusion of lags of the 
overnight conditional variance, or lagged residuals from the overnight 
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The nature and significance of volatility transmission seems to be 
different at the end of the maintenance period. The estimated 
coefficients for the seasonal dummies suggest that there is a significant 
transmission effect on the last day of the maintenance period. This last 
day transmission of volatility appears to be more than counterbalanced, 
however, by volatility transfers during the remainder of the 
maintenance period, Including during the last week. The net effect of 
these opposing forces is a poorly determined volatility transmission 
coefficient. 
Explaining the absence of volatility transmission Is problematic. One 
straightforward explanation relies on the existence of non-linearities in 
the transmission of volatility: only when volatility exceeds some 
threshold value are its effects reflected elsewhere along the yield 
curve. The fact that the mean value of overnight interest rate 
variability was found in section III to be lowest in Germany is consistent 
with this explanation. And the significance of the seasonal volatility 
effects - for example in Spain - means that we already have reason to 
suspect non-linearities: volatility transmission as a proportion of total 
volatility appears greater, the higher is gross volatility. 
But the non-linearity hypothesis hardly suffices to explain the 
counterintuitive result found for Germany. Taking together the 
evidence for the UK, France and Spain, the fact that the country with 
highest interest rate volatility (the UK) is also the country with 
smallest transmission coefficient, points in a direction contrary to the 
one predicted by this hypothesis. Further, the inclusion of non-linear 
terms. in the conditional variance specifications did not provide 
significant, or correctly signed, coefficients in any country. 
Another hypothesis that might serve to justify the absence of 
volatility transmission effects in Germany is that interbank markets at 
different maturities are somewhat segmented. However, to our 
knowledge, there is no institutional device that could explain such a 
feature of the German financial markets. Moreover, our estimated 
conditional mean equations suggest that the relation between 
mean model (proxies for direct "shocks" to the overnight rate). 
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intervention and longer term rates is not significantly weaker in 
Germany than in other countries. This result would be unlikely if 
German interbank markets of different maturities were segmented. 
Taken alongside the evidence from other countries, therefore, the 
lack of volatility transmission along the German money market yield 
curve presents a puzzle. Not least this is the case because one of the 
Bundesbank's declared rationales for wishing to stabilise the overnight 
rate is precisely to prevent volatility spilling-over into the rest of the 
money market yield curve: spillovers which - on this evidence - do not 
appear significant. 
Naturally, this evidence is not conclusive enough to criticize the 
Bundesbank's strategy or to invalidate the justification given to pursue 
it. To the contrary: our failure to find significant volatility 
transmission along the yield curve in Germany may be precisely a 
consequence of its prevailing monetary regime. So our results cannot 
be used to predict the consequences for money market volatility of 
relaxing the priority given to stabilising overnight interest rates. Such 
an exercise would clearly fall foul of the Lucas critique. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have found a significant volatility transmission effect 
from overnight to longer term money market rates for France, Spain and 
the UK. This evidence is supportive of the importance attributed by 
most central banks to achieving a reasonable level of stability in the 
very short-term money markets. I follows that since overnight interest 
rate volatility is not completely internalized in that market, it is likely 
to influence real -saving and investment- decisions. 
Although this paper did not provide a direct test of the stabilization 
hypothesis for reserve requirements, the evidence presented might 
help to illuminate the debate on that issue. Thus, in our small cross 
section of countries, we observe that those with lower (higher) reserve 
requirements tend to have higher (lower) interbank interest rate 
volatility. Reserve requirements do, however, generate a perverse 
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destabilising seasonal effect: at the end of the maintenance period, both 
the level of overnight interest rate volatility and the magnitude of the 
transmission effect to the rest of the yield curve are higher. 
Finally, we should conclude with an Important caveat. In this paper, 
despite the results for UK, France and Spain, we have not found 
significant positive volatility transmission effects for Germany. This 
finding is particularly unexpected considering the Bundesbank's 
publicly acknowledged interest and success in attaining stability in the 
short-term money markets. This evidence suggests that the strength 
of volatility transmission across financial markets may not be 
independent of the prevailing monetary policy regime and, therefore, 
that policy makers could be partially responsible for the proportion of 
short-term volatility that gets transmitted to longer term interest rates. 
Given Its obvious normative implications, the analysis of this hypothesis 
deserves additional research. 
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Table 1 
INTEREST RATE MATURITY, 1 DAY 
• , 
.4.rt .. ao + a1 (r -O}t_l + L 61 .4.rt-1 + L Yi .4.0t-1 + Et; Etlt-1 -D(O,ht) 
, .. , .. 
I 
p P 
loght '" c.>0+L'->1 IEt-1 I +L (;.)1Et-i+62dWt+6lddt 
, ... , .. 
FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN U.K. 
a, -0.12 (.01) 4E-3 (3E-3) -0.04 (. 01) 
a, -0.19 (.01) -0.10 (.01) -0.10 (.01) -0.24 (.02) 
11, -0.23 (.02) 
11, -0.14 (.02) 
11, -0.07 (.02) 
y, 0.79 (.01) 0.27{·) 0.59 (.02) 0.58 (.07) 
Y, 0.27 (.03) 
"', -0.13 (4E-4) -0.15 (3E-4) -0.15 (4E-4) -0.12 (5E-4) 
"', 0.86 (.10) 4.66 (.16) 5.74 (.20) 0.97 (.11) 
"', 3.64 (.07) 3.45 (.16) 2.78 (.08) 1.17 (.08) 
"', 0.21 (.09) -0.81 (.19) 0.18 (.16) 0.20 (.09) 
"'. 0.21 (.10) 1.04 (.14) 1.31 (.15) 0.76 (.09) 
"', 0.51 (.08) -0.85 (.17) 0.40 (.10) 
"', 0.33 (.10) -2.43 (.15) -0.84 (.15) 
6, -0.27 (.06) 1.41 (.05) 0.35 (.06) 
6, 0.52 (.14) 1.23 (.10) 2.61 (.06) 
LM 15.47 9.52 9.83 8.86 
LM2 8.11 5.48 10.46 4.60 
(a) .39 (.02) and -.12 (.03) for Lombard and Repo rates, respectively. 
- 0 stands for official intervention interest rate. 0 = -0.05 Discount + 0.20 Lombard + 
0.84 Repo for Germany. 
- Standard errors in parenthesis. 
- '-> and (;.) parameters are divided by 102• ao is multiplied by 102• 
- LM and LM2 are Lagrange tests for residual autocorrelation and residual conditional 
heteroscedasticity', respectively, both up to order five. 
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Table 2 
INTEREST RATE MATURITY, 1 MONTH 
. . 
Art " ao .. a1 (r -O)t_l + L 61 Art1 + L  Y1 AOt1 + Et; Etlt-t-D(O,ht) 
, .. , .. 
I , , 
loght = 6)0" L (o)l]Et1]" L Wi Et1 .. 611og h� .. 62 (logh� .dwt) +6) (logh� .ddt) 
'''' , .. 
FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN U.K. 
a. -0.02 (3E-3) 0.01 (2E-3) -0.01 (2E-3) 
a, -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.01) -0.04 (2E-3) -0.22 (.01) 
ll, 0.26 (.02) 
Y. 0.10 (.04) 0.22(·) 0.37 (.01) 0.55 (.01) 
y, 0.12 (.02) 0.11 (.03) 
Y, 0.16 (.03) 
... -0.13 (3E-3) -0.16 (4E-3) -0.13 (4E-4) -0.14 (3E-3) 
.. , 2.36 (.18) 6.13 (.42) 9.38 (.35) 3.74 (.30) 
.. , 1.26 (.16) 5.57 (.36) 4.14 (.43) 1.36 (.28) 
.. , 2.11 (.16) 2.74 (.41) 0.84 (.38) 2.26 (.17) 
... 2.86 (.21) 3.93 (.41) 3.13 (.49) 
.. , 2.15 (.24) -1.22 (.55) 
.. , 2.94 (.30) 3.74 (.28) 0.54 (.23) 
.. , 3.09 (.32) 
6, 0.12 (.02) -0.01 (.03) 0.20 (.02) 0.02 (.02) 
6, 0.07 (.01) -0.04 (.01) 4E-4 (4E-3) 
6, 0.01 (.01) 0.06 (.01) 0.02 (.01) 
LM 5.45 5.26 17.48 6.93 
LM2 3.97 5.05 2.51 0.98 
(a) .32 (.02) and -.10 (.03) for Lombard and Discount rates, respectively. 
- 0 stands for official intervention interest rate. 0 = ...  19 Discount+ .19 Lombard + . 98 
Repo for Germany. 
- Standard errors in parenthesis. 
- (0) a n d  ii parameters are divided by 102• 00 is multiplied by 102• 
- LM and LM2 are Lagrange tests for residual autocorrelation and residual conditional 
heteroscedasticity, respectively, both up to order five. 
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Table 3 
INTEREST RATE MATURITY: 3 MONTHS 
. , 
drt '" ao + at (r -O)t_l + E B1 drt-i + E Y1 4.0t-J. + Et; Etlt-1 -D(O,ht) 
'''' , .. 
I p P 
loght = <.)0 + E <.)1 IEt-i1 + E 6)1Et-J. +611ogh,:' +62 (logh� .dwt) +6) (logh� .ddt) 
,., ,., 
FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN U.K. 
a, -0.03 (2E-3) 5E-3 (3E-3) 
-6E-3 (3E-3) 
a, -0.05 (4E-3) -0.02 (5E-3) -0.02 (3E-3) -0.07 (.01) 
B, 0.19 (.02) -0.05 (.02) 
y, 0.17 (.01) 0.13''') 0.26 (.01) 
0.61 (.01) 
y, 0.17 (.01) 0.17 (.02) 
y, 0.15 (.02) 
"', -0.13 (3E-3) -0.16 (4E-3) -0.14 (2E-3) 
-0.14 (4E-3) 
"', 3.10" (.24) 7.49 (.48) 6.88 (.48) 
4.12 (.36) 
"', 2.55 (.31) 6.41 (.38) 5.87 (.40) 0.99 (.38) 
"', 2.85 (.30) 2.47 (.42) -1.39 (.45) 
3.08 (.38) 
... 0.74 (.29) 2.54 (.49) 3.23 (.56) -0.11 (.35) 
.. , 2.39 (.21) 
1.57 (.40) 
.. , -0.78 (.17) 1.37 (.35) -0.76 (.38) 
.. , 1.46 (.30) 
6, 0.12 (.02) -0.03 (.03) 0.11 (.01) 0.08 (.03) 
6, 0.03 (5E-3) -3E-3 (5E-3) -7E-3 (4E-3) 
6, -2E-3 (.01) 0.02 (.01) 0.04 (.01) 
LM 7.33 9.58 13.92 8.75 
LM2 1.63 5.44 3.49 3.69 
(a) .31 (.01) and -.18 (.02) for Lombard and Discount rates, respectively. 
- 0 stands for official intervention interest rate. 0 = -0.37 Discount + 0.23 Lombard + 
1.10 Repo for Germany. 
- Standard errors in parenthesis. 
- c.) a n d  6) parameters are divided by 102• ao is multiplied by 102• 
- LM and LM2 are Lagrange tests for residual autocorrelation and residual conditional 
heteroscedasticity. respectively. both up to order five. 
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Table 4 
INTEREST RATE MATURITY: I YEAR 
• • 
4.rt = ao + a1 (r -O)t_1 · E 111 Art-1. · E Y1 4.0t-1. + Et; Etlt-1 -D{O,ht) 
... . .. 
I 
, , 
E I I E-
.. ..  " 
loght = Wo+ W1 Et-1. + W1Et-1. +61loght +6a{loght .dwt) +61 {loght .ddt) 
... ... 
FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN U.K. 
0, SE-3 (2E-3) -5E-3 (2E-3) 
0. -6E-3 (.33) -0.01 (2E-3) -0.01 (4E-3) 
1I. -0.06 (.02) 
1I, -0.18 (.02) 
y, 0.02 (.02) 0.02(;11) 0.25 (.01) 0.27 (.01) 
y. 0.29 (.01) 
y. 0.05 (.04) 
"', -0.13 (2E-3) -0.16 (2E-3) -0.14 (2E-3) -0.14 (3E-3) 
"'. 0.67 (.2S) 5.55 (.32) 3.18 (.29) 4.00 (.27) 
"', 1.52 (.13) 3.85 (.24) 4.65 (.31) 0.92 (.36) 
"', 3.36 (.39) 3.64 (.37) 3.28 (.37) 1.17 (.25) 
"'. 2.12 (.35) 4.18 (.44) 2.63 (.34) 1.46 (.30) 
"'. 1.41 (.15) 
"'. -0.89 (.25) 1.37 (.35) 
6, O.OS (.02) -0.04 (.02) 0.10 (.02) 0.03 (.03) 
6, 0.06 (.01) 0.03 (4E-3) 0.45 (.05) 
6, 0.04 (.01) IE-3 ( .01) 0.05 (.01) 
LM 9.40 7.19 7.21 4.75 
LM2 1.91 10.67 5.19 0.90 
(a) .18 (.02) and -.17 (.04) for Lombard and Discount rates, respectively. 
- 0 stands for official intervention interest rate. 0 = -.90 Discount + .35 Lombard + 1.41 
Repo for Germany. 
- Standard errors in parenthesis. 
_. wa n d  w parameters are divided by 102• ao is multiplied by 102• 
- LM and LM2 are Lagrange tests for residual autocorrelation and residual conditional 
heteroscedasticity, respectively. both up to order five. 
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Table 5 .  
VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION ALONG THE YIELD CURVE 
FRANCE GERMANY SPAIN U.K. 
6, . 1 2  ( . 02) -.01 ( .03) .20 ( . 02) .02 ( . 02) 
I-MONTH 6, - . 07 ( . 005) - . 04 ( .005) . 000 (.OO4) --
6, .01 (.Ol) .06 (.Ol) .02 (.Ol) --
6, .12 ( . 02) -.03 ( . 03) . 11 ( . 01) .08 ( . 03) 
3-MONTH 6, .03 ( . 005) - . 003 ( . 005) - . 007 (.OO4) --
6, - . 002 (.Ol) .02 (.Ol) .04 (.Ol) --
6, .08 ( . 02) - .04 ( . 02) .10 ( . 02) .03 ( . 03) 
I-YEAR 6, .06 ( . 01) .03 (.OO4) .45 ( . 05) --
6, .04 ( . 01) .001 (.Ol) .05 (.Ol) --
6 1 )  62 , and 6) are the coefficients of overnight interest rate {log} 
conditional variance, 'last week additional effect' dummy and 'last day 
additional effect' dummy J respectively. 
- Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Chart 1 
MEANS OF (LOG) CONDITIONAL VARIANCES FOR MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATES 
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